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Abstract— Blockchain is a promising solution for Industry 4.0 due to its traceability and immutability. However, 
blockchain itself does not guarantee the input data integrity. The tampered data from an endpoint device can be 
a significant problem because it may result in a cascaded negative effect on the whole smart factory operations. 
In this paper, we propose an FPGA-based private blockchain system for IIoTs, where the transaction generation 
is performed inside the FPGA in an isolated and enclaved manner. For the key confidentiality and transaction 
integrity, the proposed system utilizes a PUF, soft processor, and tightly coupled sensor connections inside the 
FPGA fabric. Since all the critical operations are hidden under the hood, adversaries even with the root privilege 
cannot intervene in the transaction generation process. The implemented IIoT device provides 33 transactions per 
minute and consumes a 191 mW of power.  
¢ INTRODUCTION The industrial Internet of 
Thing (IIoT) devices are being widely deployed in 
many industrial sectors, especially in smart factories. 
For example, the Ericsson factory in Nanjing utilizes 
thousands of IIoT devices, and harnesses the data 
generated through the connected devices. It is reported 
that it dramatically improves efficiency by tracking 
actual use of tools and dispatching services and 
maintenance [1]. It is expected that billions of IoT 
devices would be connected in the near future [1]. 
However, as the number of IIoTs increases, the attack 
surface is broadened because all the entities and their 
interconnections are potential targets of attacks. It is 
reported that there are many kinds of cyberattacks on 
IIoTs from Supervisory Control And Data Acquisition 
(SCADA) to resource-constrained IoT devices [2]. 
Especially, the data tampering between entities may 
result in a cascaded negative effect on the productivity 
of the smart factory. To identify the node with 
tampered data in the event, it is imperative to utilize a 
secure transaction mechanism that provides traceability 
and immutability. In this situation, blockchain is 
regarded as a promising solution because it is 
inherently tamper-proof, traceable, and decentralized. 
It can offer unique advantages in situations where trust 
is not guaranteed among entities by utilizing digital 
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signature-based authentication and verification. 
Blockchain is categorized into two types: public and 
private. Public blockchain allows anyone to join the 
blockchain network whereas private blockchain 
requires permission to participate in the network. The 
private blockchain is more attractive to the industrial 
domain because only authorized nodes can join the 
network. 
However, adversaries may jeopardize the private 
blockchain system by acquiring the credential of the 
permissioned node. They may falsify decisive 
transactions by intervening in the transaction 
generation process. To address the security concern, 
processor manufacturers provide a hardware-based 
solution for Trusted Execution Environments (TEEs), 
which are typically isolated and enclaved processing 
features. For example, ARM introduces TrustZone, and 
Intel provides Software Guard Extensions (SGX). 
However, it is reported that there are still security 
breaches even with TEE, such as SgxPectre [3], which 
utilize the micro-architectural side-channel information. 
Thus, in a highly automated industrial domain, a more 
secure black-box model is required to completely hide 
its internal operations and lessen the attack surface of 
harming the data integrity. 
In this paper, we propose a field-programmable gate 
array (FPGA)-based blockchain system for IIoTs. The 
critical blockchain operations, such as the secret key 
management and transaction generation, are delegated 
to FPGA with the bitstream protection. The FPGA 
system is composed of a Physically Unclonable 
Function (PUF), a soft processor, and an internal 
memory. Therefore, the side-channel-attacks and 
reverse-engineering against the hardware system are 
inherently prohibited. The remainder of this paper is 
organized as follows: The background section 
introduces modern FPGA and soft processor, and 
blockchain. Related works section summarizes case 
studies integrating IoT systems with blockchain. The 
Proposed architecture section details the FPGA-based 
blockchain system for IIoTs with the threat model and 
security analysis. The Implementation and evaluation 
section elaborates PUF and FPGA system 
implementation and shows the experimental results. 
We discuss the versatility and flexibility of the 
proposed FPGA system in the Discussion section. We 
finally conclude our paper in the Conclusion section. 
BACKGROUND 
This section briefs the FPGA’s security feature, soft 
processor, and blockchain. 
Modern FPGA and Soft processor 
The FPGA is a field-programmable device, with 
which a custom hardware can be dynamically 
configured for the data-processing acceleration. It is 
widely used in applications such as the digital signal 
processing, artificial intelligence, and big data 
processing. The FPGA is also used to provide security 
for reducing the attack surface [4]. An FPGA is 
configured by a synthesized hardware design file called 
bitstream. For security, it should be guaranteed that the 
FPGA be safely configured with bitstream without 
tampering. Modern FPGA vendors are providing 
bitstream protection mechanisms, where hard-wired 
cryptographic engines such as the AES is used both to 
safely configure the bitstream and to cope with 
unauthorized use of hardware IP [5]. For decrypting the 
encrypted bitstream on a dedicated FPGA, the AES key 
is pre-stored in a non-volatile memory that cannot be 
read back. 
A soft processor is a portable and synthesizable 
microprocessor, which can be configured in the 
different kinds of FPGAs from the entry-level to the 
high-end. The FPGA vendors typically provide soft 
processors. For example, Xilinx offers MicroBlaze and 
Intel provides Nios. The main reason why a developer 
utilizes a soft processor is flexibility. The processing 
work can be delegated to the soft processor in place of 
hard-wired modules, and on-demand modification is 
easily achieved by the firmware update if the system 
requirement changes.  
Blockchain 
Blockchain, in principle, is a growing linked list of 
records, called blocks. Figure 1 shows an abstracted 
overview of the blockchain architecture. As shown in 
Figure 1, a block structure is divided into two parts: 
header and body. The block header contains block 
number, block size, and block hashes. The hash values 
are used for checking the integrity of the blocks. If a 
block is illegally modified, it is detected by comparing 
the successor's previous block hash. The block body 
contains transactions and metadata. Each transaction 
includes the sender and receiver’s addresses, data, and 
signature of the transaction generator. The signature 
generated with cryptographic formulas is for verifying 
the integrity and authenticity of transactions and for 
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proving the ownership. In general, the blockchain is 
maintained together by peers with separate storages, so 
that it is classified as a distributed ledger technology 
(DLT). In the DLT-based blockchain system, any 
updates in the distributed ledger must be verified by the 
majority of the network nodes. The verification relies 
on consensus algorithms such as Proof of Work (PoW), 
Proof of Stake (PoS), or Practical Byzantine Fault 
Tolerance (PBFT) [6]. 
To join a blockchain system, each peer should 
register its own asymmetric key to system 
administrators. In general, the Public Key 
Infrastructure (PKI) system is utilized for the 
asymmetric key authentication. In the PKI system, a 
certificate authority guarantees that a public key is 
genuine via issuing a certificate. A certificate contains 
key-related information such as the version number, 
serial number, signature algorithm identification, issuer 
name, and timestamp. A peer node with the certificate 
can join the blockchain system.   
Figure 1.  Blockchain  architecture overview 
RELATED WORKS 
There are many case studies integrating IoT systems 
with blockchain, enhancing security and efficiency [7-
12]. Huang et al. [7] proposed a credit-based consensus 
mechanism, which adjusts the difficulty of the PoW-
based algorithm. The proposed algorithm decreases the 
computing burden of the honest nodes, while 
increasing the computing complexity against the 
malicious nodes. Dai et al. [8] proposed a lightweight 
blockchain wallet using ARM’s TrustZone, which 
protects the payment verification process. However, 
the TEEs are not safe enough to assure the endpoint 
security due to the vulnerability to side-channel attacks, 
such as SgxPectre [3]. 
 Lin et al. conceptually proposed an IoT-based 
blockchain system for the supply-chain traceability of 
food [9]. The proposed system architecture has two 
kinds of nodes: full-fledged nodes performing the 
whole blockchain functionality; IoT-based light nodes 
performing simple operations. Mylrea et al. proposed a 
blockchain system for the power grid [10]. They 
utilized their proprietary testbed and smart contracts for 
the system optimization. Mazzei et al. [11] proposed a 
portable and platform-agnostic blockchain solution for 
IIoT. They utilized an embedded system referred to as 
4ZeroBox for bridging the gap between blockchain 
service and industrial machine. This paper is different 
from our work in that the focus is mainly on the system 
compatibility with blockchain without considering the 
input data protection and integrity. Florin et al. [12] 
proposed an FPGA based hardware system architecture 
for blockchain. The focus is on accelerating the 
blockchain jobs in IoT systems by duplicating SHA256 
modules.  
There are some research works addressing the 
security of sensors [13,14]. Taiebat et al. proposed a 
fault diagnosis framework for sensors [13]. The 
framework includes measures to enhance the fault 
tolerance, such as the sensor duplication and sensor 
network topology. Chanson et al. conceptually 
proposed a design methodology and requirement for a 
blockchain-based sensor data protection [14]. One of 
its goals is to create the blockchain transaction as close 
as possible to the sensing unit for reducing the attack 
vectors. 
PROPOSED ARCHITECTURE 
This section details the FPGA-based blockchain 
system for IIoTs.  
Architecture overview 
Figure 2. shows an overview of the proposed 
blockchain system architecture. Three entities are 
cooperating with blockchain: IIoT devices, Edge 
servers, and Blockchain administrators. The role of 
each entity is as follows: 
IIoT devices: Like typical IoT gadgets, we assume 
that IIoT devices are light-weight and performance-
restricted. Some devices are battery-operated. The role 
of IIoT devices is to generate (sensor) data and its 
blockchain transactions, and to report them to the 
dedicated Edge servers. Each IIoT device has attached 
sensors, embedded processor(s), and an FPGA. The 
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FPGA is initially secured by the bitstream protection 
technology and managed by Blockchain administrator. 
The FPGA works as a secure black-box engine and its 
role is to generate blockchain transactions for the data.  
Edge servers: Edge servers are high-performance 
computing systems or cloud elements with sufficient 
computing resources for Transport Layer Security 
(TLS), standard encryption, and recovery. The 
Blockchain administrator manages Edge servers, which 
work as full nodes executing the block operations such 
as block generation, verification, and consensus 
protocols. Especially, for the block generation, Edge 
servers accumulate transactions from IIoT devices and 
store them to the ledgers by creating blocks.  
Blockchain administrator: The Blockchain 
administrator organizes and manages the private 
blockchain system. It constructs a multi-layer hierarchy 
from IIoT devices to Edge servers via a private 
blockchain platform. The administrator also generates 
and/or updates bitstream for FPGAs in IIoT devices. 
Note that, only the administrator can generate and 
encrypt bitstream with self-managed AES keys. 
Threat model 
The Blockchain administrator applies a private 
blockchain platform to the smart factory for traceability 
and immutability of the stored industrial data. We 
assume that Edge servers are in a secure domain 
because they have sufficient computing resources for 
security. On the other hand, individual embedded 
processors in endpoint IIoTs have intrinsic 
vulnerabilities with limited resources. There may be 
malicious insiders and/or outsiders in the smart factory 
environment. The data from IoT devices may be at the 
risk of being misused or tampered if adversaries 
intervene in the transaction generation process for the 
sensor data [14]. It would interrupt and/or halt the 
factory operations. Therefore, it is required to generate 
the blockchain transaction in a tightly-coupled manner 
from the sensor data capture to the transaction signature 
generation.  
System architecture of IIoT device 
Figure 3 shows the block diagram of the proposed 
IIoT device and its internal interactions. There are 
mainly an embedded processor, FPGA and sensors in 
the IoT device. Especially, sensors are tightly coupled 
to the FPGA via physical interfaces such as I2C, SPI, 
GPIO, or CAN. The FPGA is configured with PUF, 
soft processor, external register, and local memory, as 
shown in the Figure 3. The PUF is utilized to generate 
a secret key. The PUF takes advantage of 
semiconductor process variations such as oxide 
thickness, metal shape, and channel length to generate 
a unique random value for each device with the same 
logical design. The soft processor works as a 
microcontroller for the FPGA system with local 
memory. Inside the local memory, the execution binary 
Figure 2.  Overview of the proposed architecture: Three entities involved are IIoT devices, Edge servers,
and Blockchain administrator.  
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for the transaction generation, soft PUF manipulation, 
and key authentication is stored for the blockchain 
operation. The external register is a communication 
channel between FPGA and the embedded processor; 
The soft processor can write data to the external register, 
of which data is accessed by the embedded processor. 
Note that the FPGA system and its execution binary are 
included in a bitstream, which is safeguarded by the 
bitstream protection scheme during the configuration 
phase. The FPGA performs two fundamental 
operations for the data integrity in transactions: i) the 
key generation and management; ii) the enclaved 
transaction generation. 
Key generation and management: The PUF inside 
FPGA fabric, often called soft PUF, is utilized for 
generating a unique private key for the blockchain 
operation. The PUF operates based on the challenge 
and response protocol, and generates a different 
response (output) with the same challenge (input) in 
each FPGA. When the bitstream is configured inside 
the FPGA, the soft PUF driver is automatically 
executed for the FPGA’s private key generation. Then, 
the soft processor applies an arbitrary input (challenge) 
to the PUF and takes its output (response). The 
response is used as the FPGA’s private key and its 
corresponding public key is calculated by the soft PUF 
driver. The soft PUF driver is designed to change the 
FPGA’s private key regularly when the key lifecycle is 
expired. Note that a different output (response) can be 
obtained by applying a different input (challenge) to 
PUF. 
After the key generation, the authentication binary 
takes the FPGA’s public key and issues a certificate 
signed by the Blockchain administrator’s private key. 
Note that, the administrator’s private key is initially 
stored in the local memory to avoid unnecessary 
interactions between the administrator and FPGA. The 
Blockchain administrator adopts the key provisioning 
scheme where multiple key sets for FPGAs are utilized 
to minimize the impact of the key leakage. A private 
key is randomly selected and assigned for each FPGA 
in the phase of the bitstream generation. Because 
private keys are stored only in the FPGA’s internal 
memory, they are not exposed to the outside of the 
FPGA fabric. Only the certificate is shared with the 
embedded processor via external registers. 
Enclaved transaction generation: The enclaved 
transaction generation means that a blockchain 
transaction is directly created inside the FPGA with the 
sensor data encapsulated. As shown in Figure 3, 
Figure 3. Detailed system architecture of IIoT device with FPGA: Sensors are directly connected to FPGA
via physical interface such as I2C or SPI. 
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sensors are directly connected to the FPGA via physical 
interfaces. The sensor’s raw data are converted to a 
digital form via analog-to-digital converter (ADC) 
inside the FPGA. Then, the soft processor reads the 
data from the ADC, and processes to generate a 
transaction. The signature of the transaction is 
computed with the FPGA's private key. The completed 
transaction is written to the external register. Then, the 
embedded processor reads the transaction and transfers 
it to the dedicated Edge server.  
Security analysis 
The proposed solution utilizes FPGA as an enclave 
for the critical blockchain operations. From a security 
perspective, the bitstream is the root-of-trust. The 
modern FPGAs offer the bitstream encryption scheme 
with AES, which can be utilized to prevent from the 
reverse-engineering and/or IP theft. We discuss the 
security concerns and countermeasures of the proposed 
system in terms of the key confidentiality and 
transaction integrity. 
Key confidentiality: The FPGA’s private key is 
generated by the PUF inside FPGA and never leaves 
the device. Thus, rogues even with the privileged 
access to the embedded processor, cannot read the key. 
Adversaries may conduct a brute-force attack by 
checking all possible private keys because they have 
access to the public key in the digital certificate. This 
kind of attack can be prevented by periodically 
updating the FPGA’s private key. It can be achieved by 
designing a soft PUF driver periodically applying a 
new challenge. 
Transaction integrity: The sensor data is directly 
gathered through physical interfaces in FPGA. The 
transaction construction process is hidden inside the 
FPGA, which cannot be intervened by attackers. An 
adversary may launch a Denial-of-Service (DoS) attack 
to paralyze the endpoint IIoT device. It can be detected 
by  employing a strict and well-organized transaction 
generation policy. A simplest method is designing a 
periodic transaction generation policy. If the Edge 
server does not receive the periodic message, it is an 
indication of failure, malfunction, and/or compromise. 
Another potential attack could be the physical abuse of 
sensors. For the smart factory systems where the 
availability is the first priority, the sensor duplication 
with the majority voting can be used in the endpoint 
IIoT devices. As adopted and proved in fault-tolerant 
systems [13], the duplication provides high availability 
because it is hard to tamper multiple IIoT devices 
and/or sensors concurrently.  
IMPLEMENTATION AND EVALUATION 
For experiments, we utilized a Zynq UltraScale+ 
evaluation board, which has the Zynq UltraScale+ and 
4GB DDR4. Zynq UltraScale+ has two sections: One 
section with a fused Cortex-A53 quad-core processor 
and the other with programmable logic (PL). A CAD 
tool, Vivado 2018.2, from Xilinx was used for the 
system development and evaluation. 
Soft PUF implementation 
Figure 4. One-bit Ring Oscillator-based PUF on 
Zynq UltraScale+ 
We adopted Ring Oscillator (RO)-based PUF, 
which is composed of 2 inverter chains. Each chain has 
an odd number of inverters. Figure 4 shows an 
implementation of an 1-bit RO-based PUF in the PL 
section, of which purpose is to generate one random bit. 
As shown in Figure 4, each loop in the inverter chains 
generates different and unpredicted frequencies of a 
clock (0→1→0…), coming from each inverter’s 
unique delay due to the manufacturing variation. Two 
counters were implemented to generate the final 
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random bit. Each counter takes the clock from its 
corresponding inverter chain and counts up. The 
counters are designed to stop when either one of them 
overflows. The final one random bit (either 0 or 1) is 
determined, depending on the counter that overflows 
first. There are two design considerations when 
implementing PUFs on an FPGA. First, the place and 
route of logic gates should be carefully configured to 
assure the uniqueness of PUF. In other words, the 
delays of inverter chains should be close enough to take 
advantage of the process variation. Second, the logic 
optimization in CAD tools should be turned off for the 
inverter chains, to prevent the logic elimination. Our 
experiment implemented the 32-bit RO-based PUF 
with the challenge and response protocol for evaluation. 
FPGA system implementation 
We utilize a soft processor called MicroBlaze from 
Xilinx for the FPGA system implementation. The 
MicroBlaze is connected with a monitoring module 
called SYSMON and a soft PUF via AXI4-Lite. The 
SYSMON is for capturing the sensor data. It has the 
analog-to-digital conversion capability with optional 
physical interfaces such as I2C. The local memory for 
the soft processor’s execution binary was implemented 
with Block-RAMs (BRAMs), which is internal 
memory in the Xilinx FPGA. The Elliptic Curve Digital 
Signature Algorithm (ECDSA), whose curve parameter 
is secp256r1, is used for the digital signature algorithm 
in blockchain. It requires a 256-bit private key. Thus, 
the 32-bit PUF module should be executed eight times 
with different inputs (challenges) for generating a 256-
bit private key. SHA256 is used to generate a hash for 
the transaction. All the software codes are written in C, 
and the compiled execution binary is included in the 
bitstream.  
Table 1 shows the hardware cost of the main 
components in the FPGA system. As shown, the system 
takes only a small amount of hardware resources in the 
Zynq UltraScale+. The PUF module consumes 1,037 
Look-Up Tables (LUTs) and 1,216 Flip-Flops (FFs). 
The counters for the 32-bit RO-based PUF occupy most 
of the resources in the PUF module. The MicroBlaze 
processor consumes less than 0.5% of LUTs and FFs. 
The SYSMON consumes about 0.05% of hardware 
resources. The 64KB local memory was implemented 
with sixteen BRAMs. The AXI4-Lite system bus 
consumes less than 0.04%. The implemented system 
can be ported to Spartan-7, one of the cheapest FPGAs 
from Xilinx. The FPGA system is able to generate up 
to 33 transactions per minute. The ECDSA takes 1.804 
sec, the largest portion of the execution time, and 
SHA256 takes only 1.668 msec. The power estimation 
reports a 191 mW for the FPGA system. 
Table 1. Hardware cost of main components on 
FPGA fabric in Zynq UltraScale+. 
Main Components LUTs (274,080) 
FFs 
(548,160) 
BRAMs 
(912) 
PUF module 
(32-bit) 
1,037 
(0.38%) 
1,216 
(0.22%) 
0 
(0%) 
Soft processor 
  (MicroBlaze 100Mhz) 
1,183 
(0.43%) 
930 
(0.17%) 
0 
(0%) 
Sensor monitoring 
 hardware 
(SYSMON) 
140 
(0.05%) 
261 
(0.05%) 
0 
(0%) 
Local memory 
(64KB) 
0 
(0%) 
0 
(0%) 
16 
(1.75%) 
System bus 
(AXI4-Lite) 
107 
(0.04%) 
117 
(0.02%) 
0 
(0%) 
DISCUSSION 
The proposed solution provides a secure blockchain 
transaction generation for IIoT systems by utilizing the 
FPGA. Since the role of the embedded processor is 
simple, it can be applied to a typical IIoT device even 
with a light-weight CPU. Our approach also provides 
versatility and flexibility because the soft-core 
processor is used inside the FPGA fabric; It is versatile 
in that it can be applied to any blockchain platform 
because the transaction generation binary in BRAM 
can be modified to follow the transaction format of 
each platform. It is flexible in that a transaction 
protocol and/or cryptographic algorithm can be 
changed by replacing the execution binary that is part 
of the bitstream. According to the experiment, the 
implemented FPGA system consumes a power of 191 
mW. Compared with the battery-operated Cortex-M-
based processor, which typically consumes hundreds of 
mW [15], the proposed solution does not require 
significant additional power to a typical IIoT device.  
The performance outcome, 33 transactions per 
minute, is translated to roughly one transaction per 
every 2 seconds for each IIoT device. It means that each 
IIoT device can report sensors’ data once every 2 
seconds to a distributed ledger. With an example of the 
Ericsson Panda factory where more than one thousand 
IIoTs are deployed, it is translated to roughly more than 
500 transactions per second (TPS) if the proposed 
approach is applied. As off-the-shelf blockchain 
platforms now provide thousands of TPS, and the latest 
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one offers 10,000 TPS [16], it means that the 
blockchain platform can accommodate more than 
20,000 IIoT devices with our approach. For the 
machinery demanding blockchain transactions with a 
higher frequency, the additional migration of time-
consuming tasks  to FPGA would be an option. Glas et 
al. [17] reported a 7ms execution time of ECDSA and 
SHA operations on an FPGA. It means that the FPGA 
based system can generate more than 100 transactions 
per second, which can be applied even to autonomous 
vehicles [18].  
CONCLUSION 
This paper proposes an FPGA-based private 
blockchain system for enhancing the integrity and 
trustworthiness of the data generated from IIoT device. 
Inside the bitstream protected FPGA, a soft processor, 
PUF, external register, and local memory are integrated 
to generate a transaction in an isolated and enclaved 
manner. The PUF is utilized for the key confidentiality, 
and the enclaved transaction generation with tightly-
coupled sensors provides the data integrity. The 
experiment with Zynq UltraScale+ shows that the 
FPGA system provides 33 transactions per minute and 
consumes a 191mW of power, which would be 
applicable to battery-operated IIoT devices. The FPGA 
system is versatile and flexible for various blockchain 
operations and platforms. In future work, we plan to 
extend our approach to the cluster level by organizing 
multiple FPGA devices with blockchain platforms.   
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